



In a recent report to the Harvard Overseers, Derek Bok called for a
new direction in legal education.1 He decried "the familiar tilt in the law
curriculum toward preparing students for legal combat," and asked in-
stead that law schools train their students "for the gentler arts of reconcil-
iation and accommodation." 2 He sought to turn our attention from the
courts to "new voluntary mechanisms" 3 for resolving disputes. In doing
so, Bok echoed themes that have long been associated with the Chief Jus-
tice,' and that have become a rallying point for the organized bar and the
source of a new movement in the law. This movement is the subject of a
new professional journal,5 a newly formed section of the American Associ-
ation of Law Schools, and several well-funded institutes. It has even re-
ceived its own acronym-ADR (Alternative Dispute Resolution).
The movement promises to reduce the amount of litigation initiated,
and accordingly the bulk of its proposals are devoted to negotiation and
mediation prior to suit. But the interest in the so-called "gentler arts" has
not been so confined. It extends to ongoing litigation as well, and the ad-
vocates of ADR have sought new ways to facilitate and perhaps even
pressure parties into settling pending cases. Just last year, Rule 16 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was amended to strengthen the hand of
the trial judge in brokering settlements: The "facilitation of settlement"
t Alexander M. Bickel Professor of Public Law, Yale University. This essay is based on a speech
I gave in San Francisco on January 6, 1984, at a joint session of the Civil Procedure and Alternative
Dispute Resolution Sections of the American Association of Law Schools.
1. Bok, A Flawed System, HARV. MAG., May-June 1983, at 38, reprinted in N.Y. ST. B.J., Oct.
1983, at 8, N.Y. ST. B.J., Nov. 1983, at 31; excerpted in 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 570 (1983).
2. Bok, supra note 1, at 45.
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274 (1982); Burger, Agenda for
2000 A.D.-A Need for Systematic Anticipation, 70 F.R.D. 83, 93-96 (1976).
5. The Journal of Dispute Resolution, published by the University of Missouri-Columbia School
of Law, is scheduled to begin publication in June, 1984.
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became an explicit purpose of pre-trial conferences, and participants were
officially invited, if that is the proper word, to consider "the possibility of
settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the dispute."6
Now the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules is proposing to amend Rule
68 to sharpen the incentives for settlement: Under this amendment, a
party who rejects a settlement offer and then receives a judgment less
favorable than that offer must pay the attorney's fees of the other party.7
This amendment would effect a major change in the traditional American
rule, under which each party pays his or her own attorney's fees.' It
would also be at odds with a number of statutes that seek to facilitate
certain types of civil litigation by providing attorney's fees to plaintiffs if
they win, without imposing liability for the attorney's fees of their adver-
saries if they lose.9
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 16. In a similar spirit, the Second Circuit has instituted a Civil Appeals
Management Plan (CAMP), which empowers a court officer to direct the parties to a civil appeal to
appear at a pre-argument conference "to consider the possibility of settlement," before their case is
scheduled for argument. CAMP 1 4-5, reprinted in 2D CIR. R. 54. Conferences are held in approxi-
mately 90% of the cases assigned to CAMP; staff counsel grant requests by the parties not to hold
pre-argument conferences because of "unsettleable issues" in fewer than one in ten cases. Letter from
Vincent Flanigan, Management Analyst, Second Circuit Judicial Conference, to Owen M. Fiss (Apr.
12, 1984). For a review of the debate over CAMP's success, see Hoffman, The Bureaucratic Spectre:
Newest Challenge to the Courts, 66 JUDICATURE 60, 70 & nn.42-44 (1982). For a discussion of the
problems which arise when judges become deeply involved in pre-trial attempts to facilitate settle-
ment, see Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REv. 374 (1982).
7. In pertinent part, Rule 68 currently provides:
At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, a party defending a claim may serve
upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to be taken against him for the money or
property or to the effect specified in his offer, with costs then accrued . . . .If [the offer is
rejected and] the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer,
the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the making of the offer.
FED. R. Civ. P. 68. The term "costs" has been interpreted not to include attorneys' fees. Roadway
Express v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 759-63 (1980); Chesny v. Marek, 720 F.2d 474, 480 (7th Cir. 1983),
cert. granted, 52 U.S.L.W. 3770 (U.S. Apr. 23, 1984) (No. 83-1437).
The proposed amended rule would provide, in pertinent part:
At any time more than 30 days before the trial begins, any party may serve upon an adverse
party an offer, denominated as an offer under this rule, to settle a claim for the money or
property or to the effect specified in his offer and to enter into a stipulation dismissing the
claim or to allow judgment to be entered accordingly ....
If the judgment finally entered is not more favorable to the offeree than an unaccepted offer
I the offeree must pay the costs and expenses, including reasonable attorneys' fees, in-
curred by the offeror after the making of the offer . . . .The amount of the expenses and
interest may be reduced to the extent expressly found by the court, with a statement of reasons,
to be excessive or unjustified under all of the circumstances. In determining whether a final
judgment is more or less favorable to the offeree than the offer, the costs and expenses of the
parties shall be excluded from consideration. Costs, expenses, and interest shall not be awarded
to an offeror found by the court to have made an offer in bad faith.
.... This rule shall not apply to class or derivative actions under Rules 23, 23.1, and
23.2.
Committee on Rules of Prac. & Proc. of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Preliminary
Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 98 F.R.D. 339, 361-63
(1983).
8. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).
9. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 provides that, in a variety of civil rights
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The advocates of ADR are led to support such measures and to exalt
the idea of settlement more generally because they view adjudication as a
process to resolve disputes. They act as though courts arose to resolve
quarrels between neighbors who had reached an impasse and turned to a
stranger for help.' ° Courts are seen as an institutionalization of the stran-
ger and adjudication is viewed as the process by which the stranger exer-
cises power. The very fact that the neighbors have turned to someone else
to resolve their dispute signifies a breakdown in their social relations; the
advocates of ADR acknowledge this, but nonetheless hope that the neigh-
bors will be able to reach agreement before the stranger renders judgment.
Settlement is that agreement. It is a truce more than a true reconciliation,
but it seems preferable to judgment because it rests on the consent of both
parties and avoids the cost of a lengthy trial.
In my view, however, this account of adjudication and the case for set-
tlement rest on questionable premises. I do not believe that settlement as a
generic practice is preferable to judgment or should be institutionalized on
a wholesale and indiscriminate basis. It should be treated instead as a
highly problematic technique for streamlining dockets. Settlement is for
me the civil analogue of plea bargaining: Consent is often coerced; the
bargain may be struck by someone without authority; the absence of a
trial and judgment renders subsequent judicial involvement troublesome;
and although dockets are trimmed, justice may not be done. Like plea
bargaining, settlement is a capitulation to the conditions of mass society
and should be neither encouraged nor praised.
actions, a "court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee as
part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The Supreme Court has read the Act to
mean that prevailing plaintiffs should normally recover their attorneys' fees, while prevailing defen-
dants are not normally entitled to such awards. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S.
412, 416-18 (1978).
In Delta Air Lines v. August, 450 U.S. 346 (1981), the Court held that Rule 68 does not allow a
prevailing defendant to recover any costs (including attorney's fees) from a Title VII plaintiff even
though the defendant had proposed a settlement prior to trial. The Court found that such an applica-
tion of Rule 68 would be contrary to the concept of the private attorney general underlying Title VII.
Id. at 360 n.27. Given the Court's insistence in Alyeska Pipeline that any expansion of the concept of
the private attorney general would require specific statutory authorization, 421 U.S. at 263-64, and
given Congress' response-the 1976 Act-it would be ironic for the Supreme Court to use its
rulemaking power to constrict the use of private attorneys general by amending Rule 68. In Chesny v.
Marek, 720 F.2d 474, 479 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 52 U.S.L.W. 3770 (U.S. Apr. 23, 1984)
(No. 83-1437), Judge Posner interpreted the "costs" provision of current Rule 68 to exclude attor-
ney's fees. He found that including them would deter private attorneys general, would thus involve
"substantive" not "procedural" effects, and would therefore exceed the bounds of the Rules Enabling
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976). Judge Posner also noted that by the mid-1970's, Congress had enacted
between 75 and 90 separate fee-shifting statutes. Id. at 477.
For statutes in other fields of law that award attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs but not to
prevailing defendants, see, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(B) (1982) (Privacy Act); 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982)
(antitrust).
10. Martin Shapiro provides one formulation of the dispute-resolution story. See M. SHAPIRO,
CouRTs: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 1-2 (1981).
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THE IMBALANCE OF POWER
By viewing the lawsuit as a quarrel between two neighbors, the dis-
pute-resolution story that underlies ADR implicitly asks us to assume a
rough equality between the contending parties. It treats settlement as the
anticipation of the outcome of trial and assumes that the terms of settle-
ment are simply a product of the parties' predictions of that outcome." In
truth, however, settlement is also a function of the resources available to
each party to finance the litigation, and those resources are frequently
distributed unequally. Many lawsuits do not involve a property dispute
between two neighbors, or between AT&T and the government (to update
the story), but rather concern a struggle between a member of a racial
minority and a municipal police department over alleged brutality, or a
claim by a worker against a large corporation over work-related injuries.
In these cases, the distribution of financial resources, or the ability of one
party to pass along its costs, will invariably infect the bargaining process,
and the settlement will be at odds with a conception of justice that seeks to
make the wealth of the parties irrelevant.
The disparities in resources between the parties can influence the settle-
ment in three ways. First, the poorer party may be less able to amass and
analyze the information needed to predict the outcome of the litigation,
and thus be disadvantaged in the bargaining process. Second, he may need
the damages he seeks immediately and thus be induced to settle as a way
of accelerating payment, even though he realizes he would get less now
than he might if he awaited judgment. All plaintiffs want their damages
immediately, but an indigent plaintiff may be exploited by a rich defend-
ant because his need is so great that the defendant can force him to accept
a sum that is less than the ordinary present value of the judgment. Third,
the poorer party might be forced to settle because he does not have the
resources to finance the litigation, to cover either his own projected ex-
penses, such as his lawyer's time, or the expenses his opponent can impose
through the manipulation of procedural mechanisms such as discovery. It
might seem that settlement benefits the plaintiff by allowing him to avoid
the costs of litigation, but this is not so. The defendant can anticipate the
plaintiff's costs if the case were to be tried fully and decrease his offer by
that amount. The indigent plaintiff is a victim of the costs of litigation
even if he settles.1 2
11. See Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J.
LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973); Priest, Regulating the Content and Volume of Litigation: An Economic
Analysis, I Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 163 (1982); Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical
Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982).
12. The offer-of-settlement rule of the proposed Rule 68 would only aggravate the influence of
distributional inequalities. It would make the poorer party liable for the attorney's fees of his adver-
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There are exceptions. Seemingly rich defendants may sometimes be
subject to financial pressures that make them as anxious to settle as indi-
gent plaintiffs. But I doubt that these circumstances occur with any great
frequency. I also doubt that institutional arrangements such as contingent
fees or the provision of legal services to the poor will in fact equalize
resources between contending parties: The contingent fee does not equal-
ize resources; it only makes an indigent plaintiff vulnerable to the willing-
ness of the private bar to invest in his case. In effect, the ability to exploit
the plaintiff's lack of resources has been transferred from rich defendants
to lawyers who insist upon a hefty slice of the plaintiff's recovery as their
fee. These lawyers, moreover, will only work for contingent fees in certain
kinds of cases, such as personal-injury suits. And the contingent fee is of
no avail when the defendatit is the disadvantaged party. Governmental
subsidies for legal services have a broader potential, but in the civil do-
main the battle for these subsidies was hard-fought, and they are in fact
extremely limited, especially when it comes to cases that seek systemic
reform of government practices."3
Of course, imbalances of power can distort judgment as well: Resources
influence the quality of presentation, which in turn has an important
bearing on who wins and the terms of victory. We count, however, on the
guiding presence of the judge, who can employ a number of measures to
lessen the impact of distributional inequalities. He can, for example, sup-
plement the parties' presentations by asking questions, calling his own
witnesses, and inviting other persons and institutions to participate as
amici. 14 These measures are likely to make only a small contribution to-
sary, which are likely to be greater than the plaintiff's own legal fees when the defendant retains
higher-priced counsel. Thus, fee shifting presents a greater risk to plaintiffs than to defendants. In
cases where the prevailing plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to a specific statute, the
defendant already has an incentive to settle, namely, to avoid becoming responsible for the plaintiff's
legal expenses at trial. (He would still be liable for the plaintiff's pre-trial expenses if the court found
that the settlement was sufficiently favorable to make the plaintiff a prevailing party, see Maher v.
Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129-30 (1980), but these expenses are presumably significantly lower than the
expenses of actually completing pre-trial preparation and proceeding to trial.) Rule 68 thus does not
make the defendant more amenable to settlement. It does, however, place additional burdens on plain-
tiffs, because under Rule 68 they would risk incurring the attorney's fees of the defendant. See Bit-
souni v. Sheraton Hartford Corp., 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 898, 901-02 (D. Conn. 1983).
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b)(3), (6), (8), (9) (Supp. V 1981) (restricting use of Legal Services
Corporation funds for, inter alia, political, abortion-rights, and desegregation litigation).
14. In a case challenging conditions in Texas' state prison system, for example, Judge Justice
ordered the United States to appear as an amicus curiae "[i]n order to investigate the facts alleged in
the prisoners' complaints, to participate in such civil action with the full rights of a party thereto, and
to advise this Court at all stages of the proceedings as to any action deemed appropriate by it." In re
Estelle, 516 F.2d 480, 482 (5th Cir. 1975) (quoting unpublished district court order), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 925 (1976). The decree which was eventually entered found systemic constitutional viola-
tions and ordered sweeping changes in the state's prisons. See Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265
(S.D. Tex. 1980), motion to stay order granted in part and denied in part, 650 F.2d 555 (5th Cir.
1981), add'l motion to stay order granted in part and denied in part, 666 F.2d 854 (5th Cir. 1982).
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ward moderating the influence of distributional inequalities, but should
not be ignored for that reason. Not even these small steps are possible
with settlement. There is, moreover, a critical difference between a process
like settlement, which is based on bargaining and accepts inequalities of
wealth as an integral and legitimate component of the process, and a pro-
cess like judgment, which knowingly struggles against those inequalities.
Judgment aspires to an autonomy from distributional inequalities, and it
gathers much of its appeal from this aspiration.
THE ABSENCE OF AUTHORITATIVE CONSENT
The argument for settlement presupposes that the contestants are indi-
viduals. These individuals speak for themselves and should be bound by
the rules they generate. In many situations, however, individuals are en-
snared in contractual relationships that impair their autonomy: Lawyers
or insurance companies might, for example, agree to settlements that are
in their interests but are not in the best interests of their clients, and to
which their clients would not agree if the choice were still theirs. 5 But a
deeper and more intractable problem arises from the fact that many par-
ties are not individuals but rather organizations or groups. We do not
know who is entitled to speak for these entities and to give the consent
upon which so much of the appeal of settlement depends.
Some organizations, such as corporations or unions, have formal proce-
dures for identifying the persons who are authorized to speak for them.
But these procedures are imperfect: They are designed to facilitate trans-
actions between the organization and outsiders, rather than to insure that
the members of the organization in fact agree with a particular decision.
Nor do they eliminate conflicts of interests. The chief executive officer of a
corporation may settle a suit to prevent embarassing disclosures about his
managerial policies, but such disclosures might well be in the interest of
the shareholders.16 The president of a union may agree to a settlement as
a way of preserving his power within the organization; for that very rea-
son, he may not risk the dangers entailed in consulting the rank and file
or in subjecting the settlement to ratification by the membership. 7 More-
15. In Glazer v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 616 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1980), for example, the court held
that the plaintiff was bound by his attorney's offer of settlement simply because he had earlier in-
structed his attorney to investigate the possibility of settling the case.
16. In Wolf v. Barkes, 348 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 941 (1966), Curtis
Publishing Company, one of whose stockholders had brought a derivative suit against several corpo-
rate officers alleging mismanagement and waste, settled privately with those officers. This settlement
effectively eliminated the stockholders' ability to get an accounting of managerial behavior.
17. For a general discussion of how unions often bind their members to collective bargaining
agreements without allowing members any role in the negotiating process or any right to ratify the
contract eventually agreed to, see Hyde, Democracy in Collective Bargaining, 93 YALE L.J. 793
(1984).
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over, the representational procedures found in corporations, unions, or
other private formal organizations are not universal. Much contemporary
litigation, especially in the federal courts, involves governmental agen-
cies,18 and the procedures in those organizations for generating authorita-
tive consent are far cruder than those in the corporate context. We are left
to wonder, for example, whether the attorney general should be able to
bind all state officials, some of whom are elected and thus have an inde-
pendent mandate from the people, or even whether the incumbent attor-
ney general should be able to bind his successors.19
These problems become even more pronounced when we turn from or-
ganizations and consider the fact that much contemporary litigation in-
volves even more nebulous social entities, namely, groups. Some of these
groups, such as ethnic or racial minorities, inmates of prisons, or residents
of institutions for mentally retarded people, may have an identity or exis-
tence that transcends the lawsuit, but they do not have any formal organi-
zational structure and therefore lack any procedures for generating au-
thoritative consent. The absence of such a procedure is even more
pronounced in cases involving a group, such as the purchasers of
Cuisinarts between 1972 and 1982, which is constructed solely in order to
create funds large enough to make it financially attractive for lawyers to
handle the case.20
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that groups have a "rep-
resentative"; 21 this representative purports to speak on behalf of the
group, but he receives his power by the most questionable of all elective
procedures-self-appointment or, if we are dealing with a defendant class,
18. According to Judge Gilbert Merritt, almost half of the cases in the Sixth Circuit involve suits
against government agencies or officials. Merritt, Owen Fiss in Paradise Lost: TheJudicial Bureau-
craty in the Adyninistralive State, 92 YALE L.J. (1983) (forthcoming).
19. In March of this year, the Civil Rights Division announced its intention to support the posi-
tion of white municipal employees in Birmingham, Alabama, who are attacking the city's affirmative
action policy, even though that policy was initiated under a consent decree that the Division had
previously negotiated and obtained in a suit to eliminate discrimination against blacks, United States
v. Jefferson County, Civ. Act. No. 75-P-0666-S (N.D. Ala. Aug. 21, 1981) (approving consent de-
cree). See U.S. to Support Whites in Suits On Bias Decree, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1984, at Al, col. 2.
In the fall of 1982, the Reagan Administration announced that it would not defend the Internal
Revenue Service's policy of withholding tax-exempt status from private educational institutions that
discriminated on the basis of race. The IRS had initiated the policy after a three-judge district court
had issued an injunction prohibiting the IRS from exempting such schools. Green v. Kennedy, 309 F.
Supp. 1127 (D.D.C.), appeal dismissed sub nom. Cannon v. Green, 398 U.S. 956 (1970). The Su-
preme Court appointed a private attorney, William Coleman, essentially to defend the decree when
the Reagan Administration announced its position. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 102 S. Ct.
1965 (1982) ("invit[ing]" Coleman to brief and argue case "in support of the judgments below"), 103
S. Ct. 2017 (1983) (affirming IRS' policy); N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1982, at Al, col. 5; id. at D21, col.
1 (describing government's actions and Coleman's appointment).
20. See In re Cuisinart Food Processor Antitrust Litig., [1982-83 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) 65,680 (D. Conn. Oct. 24, 1983).
21. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
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appointment by an adversary. The rules contemplate notice to the mem-
bers of the group about the pendency of the action and the claims of the
representative, but it is difficult to believe that notice could reach all mem-
bers of the group, or that it could cure the defects in the procedures by
which the representative gets his power. The forces that discourage most
members of the group from stepping forward to initiate suits will also
discourage them from responding to whatever notice may reach them. The
sponsors of the amendment to Rule 68 recognize the nature of class ac-
tions and exempt them from its special procedures.22 But this exemption
does little more than create an incentive for casting all civil litigation as
class actions, with their attendant procedural complexities, and leaves the
problem of generating authoritative consent for organizational parties un-
solved. The new Rule 16 does not even recognize the problem.
Going to judgment does not altogether eliminate the risk of unauthor-
ized action, any more than it eliminates the distortions arising from dis-
parities in resources. The case presented by the representative of a group
or an organization admittedly will influence the outcome of the suit, and
that outcome will bind those who might also be bound by a settlement. On
the other hand, judgment does not ask as much from the so-called repre-
sentatives. There is a conceptual and normative distance between what the
representatives do and say and what the court eventually decides, because
the judge tests those statements and actions against independent procedu-
ral and substantive standards. The authority of judgment arises from the
law, not from the statements or actions of the putative representatives, and
22. 98 F.R.D. at 363; see supra note 7. The Advisory Committee Note explains that Rule 23
class actions are exempted from new Rule 68's. scope because "the offeree's rejection [of an offer]
would burden a named representative-offeree with the risk of exposure to heavy liability for costs and
expenses that could not be recouped from unnamed class members. The latter prospect, moreover,
could lead to a conflict of interest between the named representative and other members of the class."
98 F.R.D. at 367. The danger the Committee points to, however, is not confined to class actions, but
would exist whenever an individual plaintiff represents a group, for example, as a private attorney
general.
The failure of the Committee to comprehend fully the concept of the private attorney general is
further revealed by its insistence that the result at trial be "more favorable to the offeree than an
unaccepted offer. . . ." 98 F.R.D. at 362 (emphasis added). Private attorneys general vindicate im-
portant societal interests as well as their own private concerns, see, e.g., Fortner Enters. v. United
States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502 (1969); Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 401-02
(1968) (per curiam), and yet, any benefits of an individual plaintiff's suit that redound to the public at
large rather than to the named plaintiff may not be weighed in the Rule 68 determination. For
example, in an employment discrimination case, an individual plaintiff might seek $25,000 in dam-
ages for past harm and an injunction against the continuation of discriminatory practices. He may
reject the defendant's offer to settle for $5000, go to trial, and receive an injunction and $1000. Under
Title VII, he would be able to recover attorney's fees as a prevailing party. Cf McCann v. Coughlin,
698 F.2d 112, 128-29 (2d Cir. 1983) (nominal damages of $1 sufficient to justify attorney's fees). By
contrast, under the proposed Rule 68, he stands in danger of incurring liability for his opponent's
attorney's fees on the theory that the injunction he obtained is of less value to hin than the defendant's
offer of settlement.
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thus we allow judgment to bind persons not directly involved in the litiga-
tion even when we are reluctant to have settlement do so.
The procedures that have been devised for policing the settlement pro-
cess when groups or organizations are involved have not eliminated the
difficulties of generating authoritative consent. Some of these procedures
provide a substantive standard for the approval of the settlement and do
not even consider the issue of consent. A case in point is the Tunney Act.
The Act establishes procedures for giving outsiders notice of a proposed
settlement in a government antitrust suit and requires the judge to decide
whether a settlement proposed by the Department of Justice is in "the
public interest."'23 This statute implicitly acknowledges the difficulty of
determining who is entitled to speak for the United States in some author-
itative fashion and yet provides the judge with virtually no guidance in
making this determination or in deciding whether to approve the settle-
ment. The public-interest standard in fact seems to invite the considera-
tion of such nonjudicial factors as popular sentiment and the efficient allo-
cation of prosecutorial resources.24
Other policing mechanisms, such as Rule 23, which governs class ac-
tions, make no effort to articulate a substantive standard for approving
23. Antitrust Penalties & Procedures Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-528, § 2, 88 Stat. 1706, 1707
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (1982)). In pertinent part, the Act provides:
Before entering any consent judgment proposed by the United States under this section, the
court shall determine that the entry of such judgment is in the public interest. For the purpose
of such determination, the court may consider-
(1) the competitive impact of such judgment, including termination of alleged violations,
provisions for enforcement and modification, duration or relief sought, anticipated effects of
alternative remedies actually considered, and any other considerations bearing upon the ade-
quacy of such judgment;
(2) the impact of entry of such judgment upon the public generally and individuals alleg-
ing specific injury from the violations set forth in the complaint including consideration of the
public benefit, if any, to be derived from a determination of the issues at trial.
24. In Maryland v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 1240 (1983), the Supreme Court summarily af-
firmed the district court's approval of a consent decree proposed by the government in the AT&T
antitrust case. In dissent, Justice Rehnquist, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice White, ques-
tioned the constitutionality of § 16(e). The District Court had interpreted § 16(e) to mean that the
proposed consent decree should be accepted "if it effectively opens the relevant markets to competition
and prevents the recurrence of anticompetitive activity, all without imposing undue and unnecessary
burdens upon other aspects of the public interest. ... United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,
552 F. Supp. 131, 153 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub norn. Maryland v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 1240
(1983) (per curiam). Justice Rehnquist, however, said: "It is not clear to me that this standard, or any
other standard the District Court could have devised, admits of resolution by a court exercising the
judicial power established by Article III of the Constitution." 103 S. Ct. at 1242. He continued:
The question whether to prosecute a lawsuit is a question of the execution of the laws, which
is committed to the executive by Article II. There is no standard by which the benefits to the
public from a "better" settlement of a lawsuit than the Justice Department has negotiated can
be balanced against the risk of an adverse decision, the need for a speedy resolution of the case,
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settlements, but instead entrust the whole matter to the judge."5 In such
cases, the judge's approval theoretically should turn on whether the group
consents, but determining whether such consent exists is often impossible,
since true consent consists of nothing less than the expressed unanimity of
all the members of a group, which might number in the hundreds of
thousands and be scattered across the United States. The judge's approval
instead turns on how close or far the proposed settlement is from what he
imagines would be the judgment obtained after suit. The basis for approv-
ing a settlement, contrary to what the dispute-resolution story suggests, is
therefore not consent but rather the settlement's approximation to judg-
ment. This might appear to remove my objection to settlement, except that
the judgment being used as a measure of the settlement is very odd indeed:
It has never in fact been entered, but only imagined. It has been con-
structed without benefit of a full trial, and at a time when the judge can
no longer count on the thorough presentation promised by the adversary
system. The contending parties have struck a bargain, and have every in-
terest in defending the settlement and in convincing the judge that it is in
accord with the law.
THE LACK OF A FOUNDATION FOR CONTINUING JUDICIAL
INVOLVEMENT
The dispute-resolution story trivializes the remedial dimensions of law-
suits and mistakenly assumes judgment to be the end of the process. It
supposes that the judge's duty is to declare which neighbor is right and
which wrong, and that this declaration will end the judge's involvement
(save in that most exceptional situation where it is also necessary for him
to issue a writ directing the sheriff to execute the declaration). Under
these assumptions, settlement appears as an almost perfect substitute for
judgment, for it too can declare the parties' rights. Often, however, judg-
ment is not the end of a lawsuit but only the beginning. The involvement
of the court may continue almost indefinitely. In these cases, settlement
cannot provide an adequate basis for that necessary continuing involve-
ment, and thus is no substitute for judgment.
The parties may sometimes be locked in combat with one another and
view the lawsuit as only one phase in a long continuing struggle. The
entry of judgment will then not end the struggle, but rather change its
terms and the balance of power. One of the parties will invariably return
to the court and again ask for its assistance, not so much because condi-
25. "A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and
notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such
manner as the court directs." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
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tions have changed, but because the conditions that preceded the lawsuit
have unfortunately not changed. This often occurs in domestic-relations
cases, where the divorce decree represents only the opening salvo in an
endless series of skirmishes over custody and support.2"
The structural reform cases that play such a prominent role on the
federal docket provide another occasion for continuing judicial involve-
ment. In these cases, courts seek to safeguard public values by restructur-
ing large-scale bureaucratic organizations. 27 The task is enormous, and
our knowledge of how to restructure on-going bureaucratic organizations
is limited. As a consequence, courts must oversee and manage the reme-
dial process for a long time-maybe forever. This, I fear, is true of most
school desegregation cases, some of which have been pending for twenty or
thirty years.28 It is also true of antitrust cases that seek divestiture or reor-
ganization of an industry.29
The drive for settlement knows no bounds and can result in a consent
decree even in the kinds of cases I have just mentioned, that is, even when
a court finds itself embroiled in a continuing struggle between the parties
or must reform a bureaucratic organization. The parties may be ignorant
of the difficulties ahead or optimistic about the future, or they may simply
believe that they can get more favorable terms through a bargained-for
agreement. Soon, however, the inevitable happens: One party returns to
court and asks the judge to modify the decree, either to make it more
effective or less stringent. But the judge is at a loss: He has no basis for
assessing the request. He cannot, to use Cardozo's somewhat melodra-
matic formula, easily decide whether the "dangers, once substantial, have
become attenuated to a shadow,"30 because, by definition, he never knew
the dangers.
The allure of settlement in large part derives from the fact that it avoids
the need for a trial. Settlement must thus occur before the trial is complete
and the judge has entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. As a
26. Domestic relations cases form the largest subject-matter category of cases on state court dock-
ets. See NAT'L CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: THE STATE OF
THE ART 53 (1978). Much of this litigation occurs after the entry of initial decrees. See Oldham,
Book Review, 54 U. COLO. L. REV. 469, 478-80 (1983) (reviewing L. WErrZMAN, THE MARRIAGE
CONTRACT (1981)).
27. I define the relationship between structural reform and the dispute-resolution story more fully
elsewhere. See Fiss, The Social and Political Foundations of Adjudication, 6 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 121
(1982).
28. See, e.g., Clark v. Board of Educ., 705 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1983) (continuation of Little Rock
desegregation case); Brown v. Board of Educ., 84 F.R.D. 383 (D. Kan. 1979) (seeking intervention in
original Topeka desegregation case on behalf of class represented by Linda Brown's daughter).
29. In United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244 (1968), for example, the govern-
ment successfully reopened a decade-old decree because competition in the shoe machinery market had
not yet been attained.
30. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932).
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consequence, the judge confronted with a request for modification of a
consent decree must retrospectively reconstruct the situation as it existed
at the time the decree was entered, and decide whether conditions today
have sufficiently changed to warrant a modification in that decree. In the
Meat Packers litigation, for example, where a consent decree governed the
industry for almost half a century, the judge confronted with a request for
modification in 1960 had to reconstruct the "danger" that had existed at
the time of the entry of the decree in 1920 in order to determine whether
the danger had in fact become a "shadow." 31 Such an inquiry borders on
the absurd, and is likely to dissipate whatever savings in judicial resources
the initial settlement may have produced.
Settlement also impedes vigorous enforcement, which sometimes re-
quires use of the contempt power. As a formal matter, contempt is availa-
ble to punish violations of a consent decree.32 But courts hesitate to use
that power to enforce decrees that rest solely on consent, especially when
enforcement is aimed at high public officials, as became evident in the
Willowbrook deinstitutionalization case33 and the recent Chicago desegre-
gation case.3 4 Courts do not see a mere bargain between the parties as a
sufficient foundation for the exercise of their coercive powers.
Sometimes the agreement between the parties extends beyond the terms
of the decree and includes stipulated "findings of fact" and "conclusions of
law," but even then an adequate foundation for a strong use of the judi-
cial power is lacking. Given the underlying purpose of settlement-to
avoid trial-the so-called "findings" and "conclusions" are necessarily the
products of a bargain between the parties rather than of a trial and an
independent judicial judgment. Of course, a plaintiff is free to drop a law-
suit altogether (provided that the interests of certain other persons are not
compromised), and a defendant can offer something in return, but that
bargained-for arrangement more closely resembles a contract than an in-
junction. It raises a question which has already been answered whenever
31. See United States v. Swift & Co., 189 F. Supp. 885, 904, 910-12 (N.D. Ill. 1960), aff'd 367
U.S. 909 (1961). For a history of the Meat Packers' consent decree over a fifty-year period, see 0.
Fiss, INJUNCTIONS 325-99 (1972).
32. See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.9, at 93-94, 99 n.25 (1973).
33. New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 631 F.2d 162, 163-64 (2d Cir. 1980)
(court unwilling to hold governor in contempt of consent decree when legislature refused to provide
funding for committee established by court to oversee implementation of decree). The First Circuit
explicitly acknowledged limitations on the power of courts to enforce consent decrees in Brewster v.
Dukakis, 687 F.2d 495, 501 (1st Cir. 1982), and Massachusetts Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. King,
668 F.2d 602, 610 (1st Cir. 1981).
34. In United States v. Board of Educ., 717 F.2d 378, 384-85 (7th Cir. 1983), the Court of
Appeals found that the district court had acted too hastily in ordering the United States to provide
additional financial support for Chicago's voluntary desegregation program pursuant to the consent
decree which the federal government and the school board had entered into with the plaintiffs. The
Seventh Circuit instead instructed the district court to give the federal government time to comply
voluntarily with its obligations.
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an injunction is issued, namely, whether the judicial power should be used
to enforce it. Even assuming that the consent is freely given and authorita-
tive, the bargain is at best contractual and does not contain the kind of
enforcement commitment already embodied in a decree that is the product
of a trial and the judgment of a court.
JUSTICE RATHER THAN PEACE
The dispute-resolution story makes settlement appear as a perfect sub-
stitute for judgment, as we just saw, by trivializing the remedial dimen-
sions of a lawsuit, and also by reducing the social function of the lawsuit
to one of resolving private disputes: In that story, settlement appears to
achieve exactly the same purpose as judgment-peace between the par-
ties-but at considerably less expense to society. The two quarreling
neighbors turn to a court in order to resolve their dispute, and society
makes courts available because it wants to aid in the achievement of their
private ends or to secure the peace.
In my view, however, the purpose of adjudication should be understood
in broader terms. Adjudication uses public resources, and employs not
strangers chosen by the parties but public officials chosen by a process in
which the public participates. These officials, like members of the legisla-
tive and executive branches, possess a power that has been defined and
conferred by public law, not by private agreement. Their job is not to
maximize the ends of private parties, nor simply to secure the peace, but
to explicate and give force to the values embodied in authoritative texts
such as the Constitution and statutes: to interpret those values and to
bring reality into accord with them. This duty is not discharged when the
parties settle.
In our political system, courts are reactive institutions. They do not
search out interpretive occasions, but instead wait for others to bring mat-
ters to their attention. They also rely for the most part on others to inves-
tigate and present the law and facts. A settlement will thereby deprive a
court of the occasion, and perhaps even the ability, to render an interpre-
tation. A court cannot proceed (or not proceed very far) in the face of a
settlement. To be against settlement is not to urge that parties be "forced"
to litigate, since that would interfere with their autonomy and distort the
adjudicative process; the parties will be inclined to make the court believe
that their bargain is justice. To be against settlement is only to suggest
that when the parties settle, society gets less than what appears, and for a
price it does not know it is paying. Parties might settle while leaving jus-
tice undone. The settlement of a school suit might secure the peace, but
not racial equality. Although the parties are prepared to live under the
terms they bargained for, and although such peaceful coexistence may be
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a necessary precondition of justice,3 5 and itself a state of affairs to be val-
ued, it is not justice itself. To settle for something means to accept less
than some ideal.
I recognize that judges often announce settlements not with a sense of
frustration or disappointment, as my account of adjudication might sug-
gest, but with a sigh of relief. But this sigh should be seen for precisely
what it is: It is not a recognition that a job is done, nor an acknowledg-
ment that a job need not be done because justice has been secured. It is
instead based on another sentiment altogether, namely, that another case
has been "moved along," which is true whether or not justice has been
done or even needs to be done. Or the sigh might be based on the fact that
the agony of judgment has been avoided.
There is, of course, sometimes a value to avoidance, not just to the
judge, who is thereby relieved of the need to make or enforce a hard deci-
sion, but also to society, which sometimes thrives by masking its basic
contradictions. But will settlement result in avoidance when it is most ap-
propriate? Other familiar avoidance devices, such as certiorari,3 6 at least
promise a devotion to public ends, but settlement is controlled by the liti-
gants, and is subject to their private motivations and all the vagaries of the
bargaining process. There are also dangers to avoidance, and these may
well outweigh any imagined benefits. Partisans of ADR-Chief Justice
Burger, or even President Bok-may begin with a certain satisfaction
with the status quo. But when one sees injustices that cry out for correc-
tion-as Congress did when it endorsed the concept of the private attorney
general3 7 and as the Court of another era did when it sought to enhance
access to the courts 3S-the value of avoidance diminishes and the agony of
judgment becomes a necessity. Someone has to confront the betrayal of our
35. Some observers have argued that compliance is more likely to result from a consent decree
than from an adjudicated decree. See 0. Fiss & D. RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS 1004 (2d ed. 1984).
But increased compliance may well be due to the fact that a consent decree asks less of the defendant,
rather than from its creating a more amicable relationship between the parties. See McEwen &
Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court: Achieving Compliance Through Consent, 18 LAW &
Soc'y REV. 11 (1984).
36. See generally A. BICKEL, THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH 111-99 (1962) (discussing "the
passive virtues"). For an analysis of the doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth as techniques for
avoidance, see Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67
(1960).
37. For a discussion of the role of the private attorney general, see supra notes 9 & 22. The
Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, 94 Stat. 2369 (codi-
fied at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp. V 1981)), which eliminated the jurisdictional amount in federal
question cases, reflects a similar sentiment: A claim's significance cannot be measured simply by the
amount of money involved. See H.R. REP. No. 1461, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CONG. CODE & AD. NEWS 5063, 5063-64.
38. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's decisions during the 1960's and early 1970's sug-
gesting that access to the courts and the opportunity to litigate are essential due process rights, see
Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees (pts. 1 & 2), 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1974
DUKE L.J. 527.
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deepest ideals and be prepared to turn the world upside down to bring
those ideals to fruition.
THE REAL DIVIDE
To all this, one can readily imagine a simple response by way of con-
fession and avoidance: We are not talking about those lawsuits. Advocates
of ADR might insist that my account of adjudication, in contrast to the
one implied by the dispute-resolution story, focuses on a rather narrow
category of lawsuits. They could argue that while settlement may have
only the most limited appeal with respect to those cases, I have not spoken
to the "typical" case. My response is twofold.
First, even as a purely quantitative matter, I doubt that the number of
cases I am referring to is trivial. My universe includes those cases in
which there are significant distributional inequalities; those in which it is
difficult to generate authoritative consent because organizations or social
groups are parties or because the power to settle is vested in autonomous
agents; those in which the court must continue to supervise the parties
after judgment; and those in which justice needs to be done, or to put it
more modestly, where there is a genuine social need for an authoritative
interpretation of law. I imagine that the number of cases that satisfy one
of these four criteria is considerable; in contrast to the kind of case por-
trayed in the dispute-resolution story, they probably dominate the docket
of a modern court system.
Second, it demands a certain kind of myopia to be concerned only with
the number of cases, as though all cases are equal simply because the
clerk of the court assigns each a single docket number. All cases are not
equal. The Los Angeles desegregation case, 9 to take one example, is not
equal to the allegedly more typical suit involving a property dispute or an
automobile accident. The desegregation suit consumes more resources, af-
fects more people, and provokes far greater challenges to the judicial
power. The settlement movement must introduce a qualitative perspective;
it must speak to these more "significant" cases, and demonstrate the pro-
priety of settling them. Otherwise it will soon be seen as an irrelevance,
dealing with trivia rather than responding to the very conditions that give
the movement its greatest sway and saliency.
Nor would sorting cases into "two tracks," one for settlement, and an-
other for judgment, avoid my objections. Settling automobile cases and
leaving discrimination or antitrust cases for judgment might remove a
39. See Crawford v. Board of Educ., 46 Cal. App. 3d 872, 120 Cal. Rptr. 334 (Ct. App. 1975),
aff'd, 17 Cal. 3d, 551 P.2d 28, 130 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1976). For a recent recounting of the history of
the 20 years of litigation, see Crawford v. Board of Educ., 103 S. Ct. 3211, 3214-15 (1982).
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large number of cases from the dockets, but the dockets will nevertheless
remain burdened with the cases that consume the most judicial resources
and represent the most controversial exercises of the judicial power. A
"two track" strategy would drain the argument for settlement of much of
its appeal. I also doubt whether the "two track" strategy can be sensibly
implemented. It is impossible to formulate adequate criteria for prospec-
tively sorting cases. The problems of settlement are not tied to the subject
matter of the suit, but instead stem from factors that are harder to iden-
tify, such as the wealth of the parties, the likely post-judgment history of
the suit, or the need for an authoritative interpretation of law. The au-
thors of the amendment to Rule 68 make a gesture toward a "two track"
strategy by exempting class actions and shareholder derivative suits, and
by allowing the judge to refrain from awarding attorney's fees when it is
"unjustified under all of the circumstances."4 But these gestures are
cramped and ill-conceived, and are likely to increase the workload of the
courts by giving rise to yet another set of issues to litigate.41 It is, more-
over, hard to see how these problems can be avoided. Many of the factors
that lead a society to bring social relationships that otherwise seem wholly
private (e.g., marriage) within the jurisdiction of a court, such as imbal-
ances of power or the interests of third parties, are also likely to make
40. 98 F.R.D. at 362.
41. It is far from clear that either the current offer-of-judgment rule or the proposed amendments
are likely to reduce the overall volume of litigation. Although such a rule increases the potential costs
a plaintiff faces should he lose, and thus means a plaintiff will be willing to settle for a smaller
amount than he would demand if there were no potential liability for the defendant's expenses, it also
increases the potential benefits a defendant will receive should his offer exceed the amount the plain-
tiff recovers at trial (since the defendant will both retain the difference between the offer and the
amount actually recovered and will recover his expenses), and thus means a defendant will offer less
in a settlement. There is no reason to assume that the gap between the plaintiff's demand and the
defendant's offer will be relatively smaller because of the offer-of-judgment rule. See Priest, supra
note 11, at 171.
Moreover, Rule 68 makes no exception for cases seeking non-monetary relief, such as injunctions.
It thus requires the court to decide whether the injunction actually obtained was in fact "better" or
"more favorable" than the decree the defendant was willing to enter prior to trial.
The "reasonability" language of the proposed rule, supra note 7, creates potential attorney-client
conflicts that may also spark litigation. By implication, a court which grants an offeror all of his
expenses has decided that the offeree was unreasonable in his refusal. If the offeree based that refusal
on the advice of counsel, then that advice was unreasonable, and a malpractice suit can be expected to
recover fees assessed against the client in the original case.
The proposed rule's exclusion of costs and attorney's fees from the assessment of whether an offer is
more or less favorable than an eventual judgment, 98 F.R.D. at 362, may cause additional conflicts
between plaintiffs and their attorneys. Suppose that a defendant offers a plaintiff $100,000 as full
relief including attorney's fees and costs. If the plaintiff accepts this offer, then his attorney forfeits the
right to attorney's fees under a statutory fee-shifting scheme. If, however, the plaintiff refuses the
offer, then the plaintiff may be liable to the defendant for the defendant's attorney's fees and costs,
even though the plaintiff's total "recovery" at trial-for example, $80,000 on the merits and $30,000
in attorneys' fees-exceeds the defendant's offer because the plaintiff recovered less on the merits. In
these circumstances, the lawyer may press his client to litigate because this will assure the lawyer his
fee, even though the client will thereby be exposed to possible liability for the defendant's costs and
expenses.
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settlement problematic. Settlement is a poor substitute for judgement; it is
an even poorer substitute for the withdrawal of jurisdiction.
For these reasons, I remain highly skeptical of a "two track" strategy,
and would resist it. But the more important point to note is that the
draftsmen of Rule 68 are the exception. There is no hint of a "two track"
strategy in Rule 16. In fact, most ADR advocates make no effort to distin-
guish between different types of cases or to suggest that "the gentler arts
of reconciliation and accommodation" might be particularly appropriate
for one type of case but not for another. They lump all cases together.
This suggests that what divides me from the partisans of ADR is not that
we are concerned with different universes of cases, that Derek Bok, for
example, focuses on boundary quarrels while I see only desegregation
suits. I suspect instead that what divides us is much deeper and stems
from our understanding of the purpose of the civil law suit and its place
in society. It is a difference in outlook.
Someone like Bok sees adjudication in essentially private terms: The
purpose of lawsuits and the civil courts is to resolve disputes, and the
amount of litigation we encounter is evidence of the needlessly combative
and quarrelsome character of Americans. Or as Bok put it, using a more
diplomatic idiom: "At bottom, ours is a society built on individualism,
competition, and success.""2 I, on the other hand, see adjudication in more
public terms: Civil litigation is an institutional arrangement for using
state power to bring a recalcitrant reality closer to our chosen ideals. We
turn to the courts because we need to, not because of some quirk in our
personalities. We train our students in the tougher arts so that they may
help secure all that the law promises, not because we want them to be-
come gladiators or because we take a special pleasure in combat.
To conceive of the civil lawsuit in public terms as America does might
be unique. I am willing to assume that no other country-including Ja-
pan, Bok's new paragon"'-has a case like Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion44 in which the judicial power is used to eradicate the caste structure.
I am willing to assume that no other country conceives of law and uses
law in quite the way we do. But this should be a source of pride rather
than shame. What is unique is not the problem, that we live short of our
42. Bok, supra note 1, at 42.
43. Id. at 41. As to the validity of the comparisons and a more subtle explanation of the determi-
nants of litigiousness, see Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. JAPANESE STUD. 359, 389
(1978) ("Few misconceptions about Japan have been more widespread or as pernicious as the myth of
the special reluctance of the Japanese to litigate."); see also Galanter, Reading the Landscape of
Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious
and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4, 57-59 (1983) (paucity of lawyers in Japan due to restric-
tions on number of attorneys admitted to practice rather than to non-litigousness).
44. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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ideals, but that we alone among the nations of the world seem willing to
do something about it. Adjudication American-style is not a reflection of
our combativeness but rather a tribute to our inventiveness and perhaps
even more to our commitment.
1090
Vol. 93: 1073, 1984
HeinOnline -- 93 Yale L.J. 1090 1983-1984
The Yale Law Journal






















































Kent T. van den Berg
Henrietta Wright
Ronald F. Wright, Jr.
Rob C. Zeitinger
Business Manager: Pamela Standish Editorial Assistant: Claudia Shapiro
Student Contributors to This Issue
Steven A. Baronoff, The Standstill Agreement: A Case of Illegal Vote
Selling and a Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Kent T. van den Berg, Approval of Take-out Mergers by Minority Share-
holders: From Substantive to Procedural Fairness
Ronald F. Wright, Jr., The Civil and Criminal Methodologies of the
Fourth Amendment
HeinOnline -- 93 Yale L.J. 1091 1983-1984
HeinOnline -- 93 Yale L.J. 1092 1983-1984
